\u27Sifting the wheat from the chaff\u27: a two-dimensional discriminant analysis of welfare state regime theory by Bambra C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Bambra C.  
'Sifting the wheat from the chaff': a two-dimensional discriminant analysis of 
welfare state regime theory.  
Social Policy and Administration 2007, 41(1), 1-28. 
 
 
Copyright: 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article, which has been published in final form at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9515.2007.00536.x. This article may be used for non-commercial 
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
 
Date deposited:   
04/02/2017 
 1 
<add>Address for correspondence: Clare Bambra, Wolfson Building, Durham 
University, Queens Campus, Stockton, TS17 6BH. Email: 
clare.bambra@durham.ac.uk</add> 
 
<t>‘Sifting the Wheat from the Chaff’: A Two-dimensional Discriminant Analysis 
of Welfare State Regime Theory</t> 
 
<au>Clare Brambra[qu1]</au> 
 
<ha>Abstract<ha> 
 
<ind>Welfare state modelling has long been an important strand within 
comparative social policy. However, since the publication of Esping-Andersen’s 
‘Worlds of Welfare’ typology, welfare state classification has become particularly 
prominent and a multitude of competing typologies and taxonomies have 
emerged. Each of these is based on different classification criteria, and each is 
trying to capture what a welfare state actually does. The result is that the 
literature is in a state of confusion and inertia as it is unclear which of these rival 
systems is currently the most accurate and should be taken forward, and which 
are not and should perhaps be left behind. This article extends Bonoli’s two-
dimensional analysis of welfare state regimes by using multivariate analysis of 
variance and discriminant analysis to compare and contrast the various 
classifications on universal criteria. It also examines the usefulness of the two-
dimensional approach itself and suggests how it can be enhanced to benefit 
future attempts at holistic welfare state modelling. The article concludes that 
there are some welfare state classifications that are more useful than others, 
especially in terms of reflecting a two-dimensional analysis: it thereby ‘sifts the 
wheat from the chaff’ in terms of welfare state regime theory.<ind>  
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<ha>Introduction</ha> 
 
Welfare state modelling has long been an important strand within comparative 
social policy, serving as a means of reducing the complexity of cross-national 
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welfare state provision (Wilensky and Lebaux 1958; Cutright 1965; Titmuss 
1974; Wilensky 1975). However, it is only since the publication of Esping-
Andersen’s ‘Worlds of Welfare’ thesis in 1990 that the welfare state classification 
literature has become particularly prominent (Pierson 1998). Based primarily on 
the examination of labour market decommodification, Esping-Andersen proposed 
a threefold welfare state typology whereby Western countries fell into one of 
three regime ideal-types: Liberal, Conservative or Social Democratic. Esping-
Andersen’s work has provoked an extensive ongoing debate in the literature, 
about which principles should be used to classify welfare states (Alber 1995; 
Korpi and Palme 1998; Castles 1998; Abrahamson 1999; Kautto 2002; Bambra 
2005a, 2005b); in which regimes particular countries belong (Ginsburg 1992; 
Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ferrera 1996); the number of different 
regime types (Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 
1997; Pitzurello[qu2] 1999; Bambra 2005b); the methodology of regime 
construction (Kangas 1994; Ragin 1994; Pitruzzello 1999; Bambra 2006); and 
the nature of gender stratification within different types of welfare state (Lewis 
1992; Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994[qu3], 1999; Bambra 2004).  
As a result of these criticisms a number of rival welfare state typologies 
have emerged, each based on different classification criteria, and each trying to 
capture in its own way what a welfare state actually does. Some have extended 
the remit of the welfare state modelling literature to include aspects of gender 
stratification and defamilization (Lewis 1992; Siaroff 1994; Lewis and Ostner 
1995; Esping-Andersen 1999; Sainsbury 1999; Korpi 2000; Bambra 2004; 
Pascall and Lewis 2004), while others have examined the role of welfare state 
services (Bambra 2005a, 2005b). In addition, the methodological critique of 
Esping-Andersen’s work (for an overview, see Bambra 2006) has led to the 
production of numerous welfare state taxonomies, many of them based on the 
reworking of Esping-Andersen’s data, yet still suggesting alternative regimes and 
country classifications (Kangas 1994; Ragin 1994; Shalev 1996; Obinger and 
Wagschal 1998; Pitzurello 1999; Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001). This means that 
within the contemporary comparative social policy literature, even among those 
typologies and taxonomies that only examine income protection or the labour 
market aspects of welfare state provision, there are a number of contrasting 
claims for the existence of three (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Ragin 1994; 
Shalev 1996; Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001), four (Leibfried 1992; Castles and 
Mitchell 1993, Kangas 1994; Ferrera 1996; Bonoli 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998), 
and even as many as five different types of welfare state regimes (Obinger and 
Wagschal 1998; Pitzurello 1999).  
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The result is that the welfare state modelling literature is in a state of 
confusion and inertia as it is unclear which of these competing systems of 
classification is currently the most accurate or useful and which are less so. It is 
the purpose of this article to establish some clarity in this regard by comparing 
the classifications and determining which are currently of the most utility: it will 
thereby ‘sift the wheat from the chaff’ in terms of welfare state regime theory.  
 
<ha>Typologies and Taxonomies</ha> 
 
Esping-Andersen’s original (1990) analysis of decommodification levels in 
eighteen countries produced an initial threefold typology of welfare states: Liberal 
(Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, USA), Conservative (Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland), and Social Democratic (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden).1 In using decommodification, that 
is ‘the extent to which individuals and families can maintain a normal and socially 
acceptable standard of living regardless of their market performance’ (Esping-
Andersen 1987: 86), his approach was an attempt to examine what a welfare 
state does, rather than how much money it is afforded (Esping-Andersen 1990: 
2). Conversely, though, many of the criticisms directed at his typology were 
made on the basis that it had not in fact adequately measured what welfare 
states do, nor indeed managed to correctly classify many countries. This led to 
the construction of alternative typologies, and taxonomies, each based on slightly 
different measures of welfare state labour market protection and each producing 
slightly different results (see tables 1 and 2). Typologies are theoretically 
informed categorizations of welfare states while taxonomies are purely 
empirical.[T1][T2] 
On the basis of the cross-classification of the same eighteen nations in 
terms of aggregate expenditure levels and degrees of benefit equality, Castles 
and Mitchell (1993) argued for the existence of a ‘Radical’ (Liberal subgroup) 
fourth regime (UK, Australia and New Zealand). Institutional analysis (Korpi and 
Palme 1998), cluster analysis (Kangas 1994), BOOLEAN comparative analysis 
(Ragin 1994), factor analysis (Shalev 1996), and principal component analysis 
(Wildeboer Schut et al. 2001) also supported the existence of a fourth regime 
type (see table 2). Cluster analysis by Obinger and Wagschal (1998) and 
Pitzurello (1999) suggested another subgroup, this time within the Conservative 
regime, and thereby laid claim to a possible fivefold welfare state regime typology 
(table 2). However, by extending the variety of countries used, Leibfried (1992), 
Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997) identified another distinctive ‘Latin’, or 
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‘rudimentary’, fourth regime type (Spain, Portugal, Greece and, to a lesser 
extent, Italy and France – table 1). 
Tables 1 and 2 show the different results of each of the welfare state 
classifications, both in terms of the regimes asserted by each typology and the 
constituent countries within them. A number of countries are positioned in the 
same regime type in almost all of the classifications. For example, Canada and 
the USA are positioned in the least generous (Liberal) regime type in all of the 
typologies and taxonomies; similarly, Denmark, Norway and Sweden always 
appear together in the most generous regime type (Social Democratic) regardless 
of which indicators are used to construct the typology. Furthermore, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain are considered to be the core countries of the Latin regime, 
and Germany is the one exemplar of the Conservative ideal-type model. The 
positioning of the other countries, however, is a more disputed matter. For 
example, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the UK are positioned in either the 
Liberal or the Radical regime type; Austria, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands 
are placed in either the Conservative or the Social Democratic regime type; and 
Italy and France are placed in either the Conservative or the Latin regime type 
(see tables 1 and 2). Most contentious is the case of Switzerland, which is placed 
in three different regime types: Liberal (Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ragin 1994; 
Shalev 1996; Korpi and Palme 1998; Obinger and Wagschal 1998), Conservative 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996; Pitzurello 1999), and Latin (Bonoli 1997).  
Table 1 also shows the variety of factors used to construct each of the 
different welfare state typologies. All of these typologies are designed to capture 
the income maintenance aspects of welfare state provision, yet they all do it 
using different indicators: decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990); basic 
income (Leibfried 1992); aggregate expenditure (Castles and Mitchell 1993); 
poverty rates (Ferrera 1996; Korpi and Palme 1998); or social expenditure 
(Bonoli 1997; Korpi and Palme 1998). It could be, therefore, that each welfare 
state typology is measuring a different aspect of welfare state provision and 
thereby drawing attention to different aspects of what welfare states do.2 
However, many of the factors used to devise the diverse typologies are very 
similar, such as decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990) and replacement 
rates and benefit coverage (Ferrera 1996), while others such as social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP are shared by different typologies (Bonoli 
1997; Korpi and Palme 1998). Perhaps, therefore, these diverse typologies and 
taxonomies are ultimately measuring merely slightly different aspects of the 
same underlying dimensions of the welfare state.  
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<ha>The Two Dimensions of Welfare</ha> 
 
Indeed, Bonoli (1997) argues that the welfare state typology literature can be 
divided into two halves: one of which examines ‘how much’ (i.e. the quantity of 
welfare provision), while the other examines ‘how’ (the Bismarck–Beveridge 
funding dichotomy). Bonoli argues that welfare state typologies (such as those 
outlined in table 1) measure one of these two underlying aspects of the welfare 
state more than the other: they are one-dimensional categorizations. For 
example, he asserts that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology measures the ‘how 
much’ issue whereas the typology of Ferrera (1996) encapsulates the ‘how’ 
aspect more thoroughly. Therefore, regardless of the particular individual factors 
used by each typologist, there is in fact only one of two underlying dimensions 
being measured. This leads Bonoli to use just two factors (social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP and the proportion of contribution financing and tax financing 
of social expenditure) to draw up a two-dimensional typology. He argues that, 
taken together, these two factors represent both the ‘how much’ – the quantity 
issue – and the ‘how’ – the Beveridge tax-funded universalism versus the 
Bismarck contribution-based social insurance system. As table 1 shows, his 
typology is very similar to those drawn up using a more varied or numerous array 
of factors.  
Bonoli’s work is very important in the context of this article as it suggests 
that, rather than emphasizing the differences between how the various welfare 
state typologies have been constructed and thereby resigning the literature to 
one of indecision and incomparability, it is possible to use his two-dimensional 
approach to compare all of the different typologies and taxonomies on the same 
terms. It is therefore possible to determine which, if any, of the competing 
theories of welfare state regimes are the most useful in terms of accounting for 
welfare state variation in one-dimensional (how much or how) and/or a two-
dimensional manner (how much and how).  
This article therefore utilizes a two-dimensional approach to examine the 
competing typologies and taxonomies that exist within the contemporary 
comparative welfare state literature. The aims are fourfold: firstly, to determine 
which of the income maintenance-based classifications are the most useful in 
terms of accounting for welfare state variance; secondly, which of the typologies 
measure one dimension more than the other and which dimension has dominance 
overall in welfare state modelling; thirdly, to explore which of the two underlying 
dimensions distinguishes most between different welfare state regimes; and 
finally, to compare the results of the more theoretically derived typologies with 
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the more empiricist taxonomies. Additionally, the value of Bonoli’s two-
dimensional approach will be given further implicit empirical exploration. Overall, 
the analysis will ‘sift the wheat from the chaff’ and enable certain typologies and 
taxonomies to be given more prominence within discussions about welfare 
regimes in the comparative social policy literature.  
 
<ha>Methods</ha> 
 
Comparative social policy in general, and the construction of welfare state 
typologies in particular, has seldom been underpinned by robust methodology 
(Kangas 1994; Ragin 1994; Shalev 1996; Pitruzello 1999; Gough 2001; Bambra 
2006). This has meant that many welfare state typologies are theoretically rather 
than empirically informed. For example, Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds typology 
has been extensively criticized on the basis of its reliance on averaging and 
additive indexes (Fawcett and Papadopoulos 1997; Arts and Gelissen 2002; 
Bambra 2006). Some commentators, such as Kangas (1994) or Ragin (1994), 
have responded to these problems by using methods such as cluster analysis or 
BOOLEAN comparative analysis (see table 2) to develop alternative, more 
empirically based, welfare state groupings. However, while these taxonomies are 
clearly a methodological enhancement, they merely serve to develop new, rival, 
welfare state classifications. These methods are unable to test the relative merits 
of existing welfare state typologies and thereby serve merely to further fuel 
discussions about the relative placement of certain countries and the number of 
different welfare state regimes (see tables 1 and 2). The use of statistical 
techniques that enable the more extensive comparison and testing of the 
different welfare state typologies (and indeed, taxonomies), such as analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), and discriminant 
analysis (DA), has long been advocated within the welfare state modelling 
literature (Pitruzello 1999).  
MANOVA is an extension of ANOVA (analysis of variance) that enables the 
comparison of the mean values of different groups (in this case welfare state 
regimes) for a variety of dependent variables (Weinfurt 1995; Tabachnick and 
Fidell 2001). ANOVA calculates an F-statistic that is the ratio of the variance 
between the different groups (considered to be due to the independent variable – 
group membership) divided by the variability within each of the groups 
(considered to be due to chance). A large and significant F-statistic indicates that 
there is more variability between the groups than within them and that therefore, 
the group means are not equal (Pallant 2001). In other words, it shows that the 
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groups differ significantly in terms of the dependent variable. Post-hoc tests, such 
as the Scheffe test, compare each group with all other groups to determine where 
the differences lie. ANOVA thereby enables a comparison of whether the regimes 
(groups) in each of the different welfare state typologies and taxonomies actually 
differ from one another in terms of the chosen dependent variables. In addition, 
through the eta2 effect size statistic, ANOVA enables comparisons to be made 
between the rival classifications on the basis of how much of the variance in the 
dependent variable is accounted for by the grouping or independent variable. In 
other words, eta2 helps to determine which of the diverse welfare state 
typologies/taxonomies is the most useful because it accounts for the most 
amount of variation.  
MANOVA extends this analysis to include more than one dependent 
variable (Field 2000). It compares the differences in the means of the group for 
the dependent variables both individually, through separate ANOVAs, and 
together, by combining the dependent variables into one new linear composite 
dependent variable (Pallant 2001). Descriptive discriminant analysis (DA) extends 
the MANOVA analysis as it explores the underlying dimensions of the data and 
determines which weighted combination of scores on the two variables best 
distinguishes between the different groups (Field 2000; Silva and Stam 
2001[qu4]). The weightings of variables form a new composite variable: the 
discriminant function – a linear combination of the weightings and scores on this 
variable (Cramer 2003). In this way, DA transforms the original set of variables 
into one or more new functions. DA can also be used to predict group 
membership (Silva and Stam 2001). Reflecting the MANOVA approach, a non-
stepwise method of entry was used in the DA (Field 2000). 
The choice of dependent variables is therefore very important in terms of 
the analysis that ANOVA, MANOVA and DA can provide. Statistically, the 
dependent variables need to be conceptually related but not highly correlated 
(multicolinearity); be normally distributed (both univariate and multivariate); 
have a linear relationship; and exhibit homogeneity of variance and covariance 
(Pallant 2001). More importantly, though, the chosen variables need to reflect as 
far as possible the wide variety of factors and considerations used to originally 
establish the different typologies which, as table 1 shows, range from 
stratification (Esping-Andersen 1990) to poverty rates (Ferrera 1996; Korpi and 
Palme 1998) and benefit equality (Castles and Mitchell 1993). This is by no 
means an easy task especially when, in addition to these variations, the 
availability of cross-national data is limited. Two dependent variables are used in 
this article: social expenditure as a percentage of GDP; and employer and 
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employee contributions as a percentage of total social security receipts. These 
variables provide what Bonoli (1997) refers to as a two-dimensional approach to 
welfare state classification (see the discussion above) as together they reflect 
both the quantity of welfare state provision (social expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP) and how that provision is funded (employer and employee contributions as 
a percentage of total social security receipts). 
Although much of the welfare state modelling literature has been about 
trying to get beyond aggregate measures of funding and provision (see for 
example Esping-Andersen 1990: 2, or indeed table 1), the social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP variable is in fact highly correlated (see table 3) with a 
number of the other indicators that have been used to construct welfare state 
typologies. For example, the correlation between social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP and poverty rates is –0.783 (p < 0.0001). Furthermore, social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP is used as one of the main measures in a 
number of welfare state typologies, such as Castles and Mitchell (1993) or Korpi 
and Palme (1998), and employer and employee contributions as a percentage of 
total social security receipts is used by Bonoli (1997) and reflects Leibfried 
(1992). Therefore, although by no means exhaustive, these two robust variables 
do offer a fairly indicative universal overview of the measures that have been 
used in welfare state classifications (Bonoli 1997).[T3]  
The data for the social expenditure as a percentage of GDP variable were 
obtained from the OECD (2004) and cover 21 countries: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. These countries (see table 4) represent all of 
those used by the various different welfare state typologies (with the exception of 
Luxembourg, which has not been included in the analysis as it is only considered 
by Ferrera 1996 and Bonoli 1997). The social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
variable is the mean calculated for the period 1997–2001 to minimize the 
influence of any year-on-year fluctuation. The data for the contributions as a 
percentage of total social security receipts variable were recalculated from the 
ILO ‘Cost of Social Security Database’ (1996). Subsequently, the data for this 
variable are older (ranging from 1990 to 1994) and generally only represent one 
year’s worth of data. This reflects the fact that, although more recent data are 
available for this variable for the sixteen European countries (EU 2005), for the 
five non-European countries the ILO (1996) was the only source. Therefore, to 
ensure data comparability between the European and non-European countries 
this data source was used for all the countries. It should be noted that these data 
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relate to different time periods from those used in the original typologies and 
taxonomies. All analysis was carried out using SPSS version 11.0.[T4] 
 
<ha>Results</ha> 
 
The results of the one-way between groups ANOVAs are presented in tables 5, 6, 
7 and 8.3 Overall, they show that the differences between welfare state regimes 
were statistically significant in the majority of the typologies and taxonomies 
tested. The significant ANOVAs all show large (>0.25) eta2 effect sizes (Weinfurt 
1995).[T5][T6]  
The results of the one-way ANOVAs for social expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP (tables 5 and 6) show that the Ferrera (1996) typology has the highest 
eta2 score of 0.67. This indicates that 67 per cent of the variance in the 
dependent variable – social expenditure – is accounted for by the independent 
variable – Ferrera’s welfare state regimes. Similarly, the results in table 6 show 
that the typologies of Esping-Andersen (1990), Leibfried (1992), Castles and 
Mitchell (1993) and Bonoli (1997) all achieve statistically significant differences (p 
< 0.05) between welfare state regimes in terms of social expenditure and they all 
offer large effect sizes accounting for between 57 per cent (Esping-Andersen) and 
65 per cent (Leibfried, Castles and Mitchell) of variance. Indeed, only Korpi and 
Palme’s (1998) typology does not achieve statistical significance (p = 0.20), 
indicating that there is no significant difference between their welfare state 
regimes in terms of mean social expenditure. 
The results for the taxonomies (table 6) are similar as all bar one (Shalev 
1996) achieve statistical significance (p < 0.05) and the eta2 values, ranging from 
0.50 to 0.84, indicate strong effect sizes. The Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001) 
taxonomy offers the largest eta2 value of 0.84, which suggests that their welfare 
state regime classification accounts for 84 per cent of variance in social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Post-hoc comparisons using the Scheffe test 
indicated that the Liberal (Anglo-Saxon, British, etc.) regime type differed 
significantly (p < 0.05) from the Social Democratic (Nordic, Scandinavian, etc.) 
regime type consistently across all the typologies and taxonomies that achieved 
overall significance. This reflects the fact that in all the welfare state models the 
Liberal-style regime had the lowest value for social expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP (ranging from 16.15 to 20.83) while the Social Democratic-style regime 
had the highest (26.63 to 28.03). The post-hoc tests also suggested that in a 
number of cases (Esping-Andersen, Ferrera, Ragin, Wildeboer Schut et al.) the 
Liberal-style regime differed significantly from the Conservative-style (Bismarck, 
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Corporatist, etc.) regime. None of the welfare state models indicated a significant 
difference between the other regime types, with the exception of Kangas (1994), 
where a significant difference was also found between the Social Democratic 
regime type and the Radical regime.[T7][T8] 
The results of the one-way ANOVAs for employer and employee 
contributions as a percentage of total social security receipts (tables 7 and 8) 
show a similar pattern for the typologies. Ferrera (1996) again has the highest 
effect size of 0.65. On this variable all the other typologies achieve statistical 
significance and large effect sizes (0.38 and above), including the Korpi and 
Palme model (p = 0.02; eta2 = 0.49). However, the results for the taxonomies 
are much less positive as only three (Kangas, Obinger and Wagschal, Pitzurello) 
of the six models show evidence of a statistically significant difference between 
welfare state regimes on this variable. Obinger and Wagschal’s model has the 
largest effect size of 0.60, suggesting that welfare state regime membership 
accounts for 60 per cent of the variation in employer and employee contributions 
as a percentage of total social security receipts. The post-hoc Scheffe tests show 
a great deal of variety in the models as to which regimes differ significantly from 
one another, as while the taxonomy Scheffe tests (table 7) reveal significant 
differences between Conservative and Radical, there is no clear pattern of 
difference in the typologies (table 7). The typologies show four significant post-
hoc differences: Liberal and Conservative (Esping-Andersen, Ferrera); Liberal and 
Latin (Leibfried); Conservative and Radical (Castles and Mitchell); Conservative 
and Social Democratic (Bonoli, Ferrera). Generally, these patterns suggest that 
significant differences in contributions as a percentage of total receipts exist 
between the higher- and the lower-scoring regimes in each typology. In all the 
typologies (table 7) and taxonomies (table 8), the Conservative regimes scored 
the highest (ranging from 60.73 to 74.33) and the Liberal (26.26 to 50.71) and 
Radical the lowest (8.61 to 23.53).    
The MANOVA results, in which the two dependent variables are combined 
(table 9), reflect the patterns evident in the single dependent variable ANOVAs. 
Most importantly, Ferrera’s typology with an eta2 of 0.66 accounts for the most 
variance in the combined dependent variable, just as it did for both of the 
dependent variables in their separate ANOVAs. Similarly, the Korpi and Palme 
typology once more failed to achieve statistical significance, suggesting that in 
the combined MANOVA analysis, the means scores of their welfare state regimes 
do not differ. There are also some interesting differences between the single 
ANOVAs and the MANOVA results. For example, Esping-Andersen’s typology 
accounted for 57 per cent of the variance in social expenditure as a percentage of 
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GDP (table 5) and 38 per cent of employer and employee contributions (table 7). 
However, in the MANOVA analysis of the combined variable Esping-Andersen’s 
typology only accounted for 37 per cent of the variance (table 9). Conversely, 
Shalev’s typology, which did not achieve a statistically significant ANOVA for 
either variable, accounted for 42 per cent of the variance in the combined 
dependent variable. These results reflect the fact that the MANOVA analysis takes 
into account the correlation between the dependent variables. Also, the overall 
MANOVA results suggest that some typologies and taxonomies perhaps reflect 
one variable – and therefore one dimension of welfare provision – more than the 
other, while others reflect both variables and therefore both dimensions of the 
welfare state.[T9]  
Discriminant analysis (DA) offers the opportunity to examine these 
underlying dimensions in more detail and determine which weightings of variables 
(functions) discriminate the most between the different groups in each typology 
and taxonomy. Table 10 shows the key statistics produced by the DA for each of 
the welfare state typologies and taxonomies. Around half of the typologies and 
taxonomies reflect two underlying dimensions (reflected by the number of 
statistically significant discriminant functions) but the other half reflect only one, 
suggesting that only one dimension distinguishes between the groups. Those 
typologies and taxonomies that have variate correlations which are positive for 
both of the variables (social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, employer and 
employee contributions as a percentage of total social expenditure receipts), such 
as function 1 for Esping-Andersen, suggest that it is the combination of the two 
variables that discriminates between the groups. Those typologies that have 
significant discriminant functions with one negative correlation and one positive 
correlation with the variables, such as function 2 for Leibfried, indicate that it is 
the difference between the variables that separates the groups. For each 
significant discriminant function, the variable with the higher canonical correlation 
coefficient contributes the most to group separation. The group variate centroids 
(mean function scores for each group) show which groups the discriminant 
function distinguishes between. So, for example, in the case of Esping-Andersen’s 
typology (see table 10) there is only one significant discriminant function 
(function 1 p = .002), it is the combination of the variables that distinguishes 
between the groups as both correlations are positive (r = .789; r = .509), social 
expenditure contributes the most to group separation, r = .789 (although the 
contribution of the other variable is still large, r = .509), and the group variate 
centroids suggest that the discriminant function discriminates the Social 
Democratic group 3 from the other two groups, particularly the Liberal group 1 
 12 
(as the difference between these two scores, 1.076 and –1.879, is the 
largest).[T10]  
The DA shows that the welfare state classifications of Esping-Andersen, 
Ragin, Shalev, Pitzurello and Wildeboer Schut et al. all reflect only one underlying 
dimension: in all cases except Shalev, it is the combination of the variables that 
distinguishes between the groups; social expenditure contributes the most to 
group separation (although in the cases of Esping-Andersen and Pitzurello the 
contributions correlation is also large). Also, the variate centroids suggest that 
the function discriminates the most between the Liberal group 1 and the Social 
Democratic group 3 (Esping-Andersen, Shalev, Ragin); the Liberal group 1 and 
the Radical group 4 compared to the other groups (Pitzurello); and between the 
Liberal group 1 and the other groups (Wildeboer Schut et al.). The typologies of 
Leibfried, Castles and Mitchell, Ferrera, Bonoli, Kangas, and Obinger and 
Wagschal encapsulate a two-dimensional approach as each has two significant 
discriminant functions. In each case, one of the discriminant functions shows 
social expenditure as contributing most to the discrimination between the groups 
and the other shows contributions as a percentage of total social security receipts 
as contributing most to group discrimination. The variate centroids suggest that 
the social expenditure weighted discriminant function discriminates most between 
the Liberal group 1 and the other groups (Leibfried, Bonoli, Kangas), while the 
discriminant function weighted more by contributions as a percentage of total 
social security receipts distinguishes most between the Social Democratic group 3 
and the other groups (Leibfried, Ferrera, Bonoli, Kangas, Obinger and Wagschal). 
However, in the fourfold regime classification of Castles and Mitchell, the 
contributions weighted variate centroids distinguish most between the Radical 
group 4 (–1.306) and the others, particularly the Conservative group 2 (.943). 
Again, as expected from the MANOVA, the DA of the Korpi and Palme typology 
was not significant.  
To summarize, the results of the single ANOVAs showed that out of the 
typologies, Ferrera’s accounted for the highest amount of variance for each of the 
two variables, and that differences between particular groups varied by typology. 
The MANOVA confirmed Ferrera’s position as the highest-scoring typology and 
Korpi and Palme as the lowest; and the DA suggested that some welfare state 
classifications were two-dimensional, while those that were one-dimensional 
reflected the social expenditure as a percentage of GDP variable more than the 
contributions as a percentage of total social security receipts variable. 
Furthermore, the DA provided clarity, unattained via the single ANOVAs, that 
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both variables distinguished most between the Liberal groups and the other 
groups, or the Social Democratic groups and the others. 
Finally, as the welfare state taxonomies were in part developed to be a 
more methodologically robust and empirical way of classifying welfare states than 
the typologies (Kangas 1994; Ragin 1994; Shalev 1996; Pitruzello 1999), it is 
worth considering whether the taxonomies account for more of the variance in 
the two dependent variables and in the combined MANOVA variable than the 
typologies. One-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests were used to compare the average 
eta2 values of the typologies and the taxonomies for each of the variables and the 
combined MANOVA variable: no significant differences were found (social 
expenditure p = 0.59; employer and employee contributions p = 0.07; combined 
p = 0.59). This suggests that overall the taxonomies did not account for 
significantly more variance than the typologies. 
 
<ha>Discussion</ha> 
 
One of the central aims of this article was to discover which of the various 
competing welfare state classifications, both typologies and taxonomies, were the 
most currently useful and which the least. In one respect the results have 
enabled this aim to be fulfilled, as it is clear that some typologies account for 
more welfare state variance than others. However, the amount of variance in the 
two variables – social expenditure and employee and employer contributions – 
accounted for by a number of the typologies and taxonomies is in fact very 
similar. Ferrera’s (1996) typology achieved the highest eta2 values in both of the 
single ANOVAs (0.67 for social expenditure and 0.65 for employer and employee 
contributions), and it also scored the highest eta2 value in the MANOVA. It would 
therefore be simple to conclude that the Ferrera typology accounts for the most 
variance and is therefore the most useful of the competing welfare state 
classifications – the ‘wheat’, to follow through on the metaphor. However, the 
results are in fact much less clear-cut than this as a number of the classifications 
achieved eta2 values very similar to Ferrera’s (and not significantly different from 
one another). For example, in the social expenditure single ANOVA, the 
typologies of Leibfried (1992), Castles and Mitchell (1993), and Bonoli (1997) 
also achieved eta2 values in the 0.60s, as did the taxonomies of Kangas (1994), 
Ragin (1994) and Pitzurello (1999). Indeed, on this variable Ferrera was not 
actually the highest-scoring classification as the Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001) 
taxonomy achieved an eta2 value of 0.82. Similarly, in the single ANOVA for 
employer and employee contributions, Leibfried (1992), Bonoli (1997) and 
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Obinger and Wagschal (1998) all obtained similar eta2 scores to Ferrera. On the 
whole, the MANOVA results were likewise, with a number of typologies scoring 
similarly. This suggests that, far from having one single typology that stands out 
from the others, there are in fact a number of typologies that offer comparable 
levels of variance explanation. This poses somewhat of a dilemma as it means 
that, as a result of this endeavour, the welfare state modelling literature is 
actually little nearer to determining which individual classification model is the 
most useful.  
However, while the analysis has been unable to determine conclusively 
which classification system is the ‘wheat’, it has been more successful in ‘sifting 
out the chaff’: the classifications of Korpi and Palme (1998) and Shalev (1996) 
were non-significant for the social expenditure single ANOVA, and the taxonomies 
of Ragin (1994), Shalev (1996), and Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001) were non-
significant in the employee and employer contributions single ANOVA. The 
MANOVA replicated the non-significant results for Korpi and Palme (1998) but it 
also produced another, less expected result: despite achieving high eta2 scores in 
each of the single ANOVAs, Esping-Andersen’s ‘Three Worlds’ typology, by far the 
most prominent of all welfare state classification systems, accounted for the 
lowest amount of variance (apart from the non-significant results) in the 
MANOVA. This suggests perhaps that his typology is less useful than others when 
considering a two-dimensional approach. Overall, the analysis suggests that the 
typologies and taxonomies shown to score low eta2 values or non-significant 
ANOVAs can perhaps therefore be given less accord within future discussions 
about the number and consistency of welfare state regimes.  
However, the typologies and taxonomies cannot be discounted or 
reinforced on the basis of the ANOVA, MANOVA and eta2 analyses alone. The 
results of the DA must also be considered, particularly in terms of the extent to 
which the different welfare state classifications measure one or two dimensions of 
welfare state provision. Those typologies and taxonomies shown by the DA to 
measure only one or other of the two underlying welfare state dimensions of ‘how 
much’ and ‘how’ (Bonoli 1997) should be given less prominence than those that 
are shown to reflect both aspects more adequately. The DA confirmed that in 
some cases the typologies and taxonomies reflected only one dimension. For 
example, in the classifications of Esping-Andersen (1990), Ragin (1994), Shalev 
(1996), Pizurello (1999) and Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001), social expenditure 
was much more prominent, whereas in other cases, most notably Leibfried 
(1992), Castles and Mitchell (1993), Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997), the DA 
showed that typologies can encapsulate both aspects of welfare state provision. 
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Those that measure both aspects should surely be given more weighting in the 
welfare state modelling literature than those that only examine one. 
This is especially the case for those typologies, such as that of Esping-
Andersen, for which claims are made that they ‘get beyond aggregate measures 
of welfare state expenditure’ by creating alternative means of comparison, such 
as decommodification. The DA results show that for the majority of typologies 
and taxonomies it is the social expenditure as a percentage of GDP weighted 
variate that discriminates most between the regime types. When these results 
are taken together with the correlations between social expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP and other measures of welfare state provision, such as 
decommodification, it suggests that a number of welfare state typologies still only 
reflect expenditure and little more. In common with criticisms made by those 
such as Castles and Mitchell (1993) or Bonoli (1997), it suggests that a lot of the 
attempts to ‘get beyond’ using expenditure as a means of comparing and 
contrasting different welfare states have failed, and that perhaps this aspect of 
welfare state modelling still needs to be fully achieved. The analysis in this article 
suggests that the attempt to ‘get beyond’ aggregate expenditure comparisons 
should remain as one of the focuses of comparative research.  
The two-dimensional analysis has also revealed which welfare state 
regimes differ most from one another in terms of either and both dimensions. The 
results of the post-hoc tests in the single ANOVAs suggested that in the majority 
of the different typologies and taxonomies, the social expenditure variable (the 
‘how much’ dimension) distinguished most between the Liberal-type and the 
Social Democratic-type regimes, in other words between the highest and the 
lowest expenditure regimes in all of the typologies. Perhaps more interestingly, 
though, in those classifications that included a Radical fourth regime type, the 
single ANOVA for employer and employee contributions revealed significant 
differences between the Conservative and Radical regime types. It was, as 
expected from the literature, the Conservative regimes that scored the highest in 
terms of employer- and employee-based funding; however, it was the Radical 
rather than the Liberal regimes that scored the lowest. These results reinforce 
one of the common tenets of the welfare state literature - the stark differences 
between the Liberal and Social Democratic regime types (however constituted) - 
but it also lends further support to the arguments of those such as Castles and 
Mitchell (1993) that a distinctive Radical regime exists, one which is more clearly 
Beveridgian than Bismarckian (Bonoli 1997) in orientation, even more so than the 
Liberal-style regime. To some extent, the DA reinforces these conclusions as the 
discriminant functions weighted more by social expenditure were shown to 
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discriminate most between the Liberal regime and the other regime types. 
However, while the post-hoc tests in the contributions single ANOVA suggested 
differences between the Conservative and the other welfare state regime types, 
in the DA, the weighted variate was better at separating the Social Democratic 
regime type from the others. This perhaps suggests that it is the lack of 
contributions-based funding that is creating the divisions. The DA does, however, 
go a little further than the single ANOVAs in terms of lending support to 
proponents of the Radical regime type as in some of the typologies and 
taxonomies, such as Pitzurello (1999), the social expenditure weighted variate 
also discriminated well between the Liberal and Radical regimes, and in the case 
of Castles and Mitchell (1993), the Radical group was distinguished from the 
others most by the contributions weighted variate. 
The two-dimensional approach proposed by Bonoli (1997) and used within 
this analysis has therefore produced a means of comparing and contrasting the 
different regime classifications that are currently circulating in the comparative 
welfare state literature. Although not without its own limitations, which are 
acknowledged by Bonoli himself, the approach does offer a productive way 
forward in terms of enabling the construction of a welfare state typology which 
reflects both aspects of the welfare state modelling literature, at least as it 
currently stands in terms of the income maintenance dimension. It is perhaps 
surprising, then, that the results in this article have not shown Bonoli’s own 
typology, based as it is on the two dimensions alone, to be of even more utility. 
There are at least three reasons for this (but it needs to be reiterated that 
Bonoli’s typology accounts for a very high amount of variance in the MANOVA 
with an eta2 of 0.62). On the one hand, Bonoli’s analysis was much earlier than 
the one in this article and the data he used were from a different date and 
source. However, perhaps more influential was the fact that the method used by 
Bonoli to put countries into regime types relied merely on cross-classification (see 
Bonoli 1997), and therefore, unlike the MANOVA, it did not take into account any 
correlation between the two dimensions, and this may have led to incorrect 
classification. Alternatively, of course, there could be a third underlying dimension 
of welfare state provision that Bonoli’s two-dimensional approach overlooks, such 
as the mix of cash benefits and welfare state services (Castles 1998; Kautto 
2002; Bambra 2005a, 2005b). The two-dimensional approach could therefore be 
extended both methodologically, by using a more robust system of classification 
such as cluster analysis, and empirically, by including this third dimension – the 
‘how spent’ aspect of welfare state provision. Perhaps then, the welfare state 
modelling literature will finally succeed in obtaining a holistic typology. 
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<ha>Limitations</ha> 
 
The research in this article is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, as 
pointed out in the discussion section, it only examines two dimensions, which are 
themselves based on two indicators – social expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
and employer and employee contributions as a percentage of total social security 
receipts. If other indicators, or more indicators, had been used the results may 
have been different. Therefore, although multivariate analysis was used, this 
means that it is likely that other, unaccounted-for factors are exerting influence 
on welfare state variation. Subsequently, caution should be applied to the results 
and their interpretation, not least as the statistical correlations and associations 
discussed do not necessarily equate with explanation or causation. Furthermore, 
the data used for the contributions variable were prone to possible year-on-year 
variation and they were limited to the years 1990–4. Also, it needs to be noted 
that the various typologies and taxonomies were based on data from differing 
years (e.g. Esping-Andersen’s data were from 1980) and so this article cannot 
comment on the original fit of the classifications, it is only able to examine their 
current relevance. The typologies and taxonomies may well have been more 
accurate at the time they were originally constructed (e.g. in the 1980s for 
Esping-Andersen), and they may still be currently accurate if all their constituent 
variables are included (e.g. if decommodification indicators were reanalysed for 
the 1990s for Esping-Andersen, or institutional characteristics were somehow 
included in the reassessment of the Korpi and Palme model).4 It is also important 
to acknowledge that welfare regime patterns change over time and that this 
article has only examined the applicability of welfare state classifications at one 
point in time. It is quite possible that different typologies and taxonomies will be 
accurate at different time points. Finally, most typologies were perhaps intending 
to measure something other than the two dimensions, and indeed some of them 
are based on a variety of factors, not all of which are quantifiable. The analysis in 
this article is perhaps therefore limited by overly quantifying and thereby 
marginalizing the more qualitative and theoretical aspects of typology 
construction. 
 
<ha>Conclusion</ha> 
 
Although the analysis has been unable to determine with any certainty which 
individual classification is the most useful, it has provided evidence that one 
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subgroup of the diverse regime classifications is more useful than the others. This 
is particularly the case when examining whether the classifications encapsulate 
one dimension or two dimensions of the welfare state. It is proposed in this 
article that those typologies that, in the DA, reflect the two underlying dimensions 
should be given more prominence than those that only reflect one. Furthermore, 
the eta2 results for the ANOVAs and the MANOVA should also be taken into 
consideration, with those classifications obtaining higher eta2 values accounting 
for more variation. This means that the four typologies of Leibfried (1992), 
Castles and Mitchell (1993), Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997), and the two 
taxonomies of Kangas (1994) and Obinger and Wagschal (1998) emerge as the 
‘wheat’ while the others, particularly those that have non-significant differences 
between regime types, particularly Korpi and Palme (1998) and to a lesser extent 
Shalev (1996), or which only reflect one dimension of the welfare state, such as 
Ragin (1994), Shalev (1996), and Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001) and to a lesser 
extent Esping-Andersen (1990) and Pitzurello (1999), are the ‘chaff’. In addition, 
the analysis has reinforced the fact that the differences between certain welfare 
state regime types are more pronounced, particularly those between the Liberal 
and the Social Democratic types. However, it has also highlighted and upheld 
arguments for the existence of a distinctive Radical regime type. 
Methodologically, this article has pioneered the use of ANOVA, MANOVA and DA in 
terms of the comparative welfare state literature and has demonstrated the value 
of these methods in taking the modelling debate forward. Future research should 
rely more on such sophisticated analytical approaches and expand empirically 
upon the two-dimensional approach of ‘how much’ and ‘how’ by adding the third 
dimension of ‘how spent’ in terms of the cash benefits and welfare state services 
mix (Bambra 2005a, 2005b). 
 
<ha>Notes </ha> 
 
1. <not>Esping-Andersen also reflects upon social stratification and the public–
private mix in welfare state provision. However, it is his decommodification 
index typology that is widely cited (see, for example, Arts and Gelissen 2002). 
2. It should also be noted that the Korpi and Palme typology is also based on 
more theoretical and qualitative data about the institutional characteristic of 
social insurance.  
3. It is more usual to run the MANOVA first and then follow up with the single 
ANOVAs. 
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4. An updated analysis of the full decommodification indicator set by Bambra 
(2006) suggests, however, that in the case of Esping-Andersen the threefold 
typology is no longer accurate. Furthermore, research by Scruggs and Allan 
(2005) has questioned the original 1980 validity of the threefold 
classification.</not> 
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